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An Ethical Indicator in the Decision-Making Process. 
Transcendent Motives 
The conceptualization of transcendent motives - together with the extrinsic 
and intrinsic motives - opens a channel to unite theory and practice in the 
realm  of  moral  education.  The  conceptual  axis  of  the  analysis  is  the 
decision-making process framed in a context where there are "others" that 
receive  the impact  of  our  actions.  Transcendent  motives  clarify  the real 
value we assign to those others, if we treat them like persons, or rather "in 
function  of,  or  "as  a  means  to"  further  our  personal  interests.  Rational 
motivation based on these motives makes us prudent and develops in us 
the valuative knowledge that serves us to discover in an experiential (rather 
than theoretical) manner personal realities. Via the case method students 
are taught the three types of criteria needed to learn how to internalize 
persons as a value in and of themselves. 
1 Introduction
Ethical reflection is far from being at the margins of current philosophical 
debates.  The  concern  with  the  manner  in  which  it  can  illuminate  the 
practical aspects of reality is very much present in issues such as education, 
new technology,  or  the  foundations  for  the  legitimization  of  the  social 
system.  In  all  these  ongoing  debates  we  could  find,  with  appreciable 
differences, the same preoccupation to offer an answer to the demoralized 
relativism that pervades our society: a recovery of a Kantian formalism in 
the dialogic  ethics  (Habermas,  Apel,  the late  Kohlberg);  a  return to the 
Aristotelian concept of virtue and its concomitant social values (MacIntyre); 
an effort to set the bases for a common framework of fundamental values 
within  a  pluralistic  society  (Peters,  White  and  other  English  authors);  a 
deepening of the democratic values reconciling individualism and solidarity 
(the intellectual legacy of Arendt and the contribution of the Esprit group 
from France). These, and many other efforts that could be mentioned here, 
form a global landscape that is far from disheartening.
Liberal rationalism - the leading ideology nowadays - lacks the tools needed 
to reconcile personal education with civic education, a circumstance that is 
leading to a notorious ethical  disintegration in the so called first  world 
countries,  accompanied  by  the  also  notorious  repercussions  in  other 
countries,  as  in the case of  terrorism.  What  we  are  witnessing is  not  a 
confrontation between democratic freedom and fundamentalism, but  the 
tremendous  consequences  of  a  generalized  moral  collapse.  In  modern 
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times  economy  and  work  occupy  the  public  space  while  morality  and 
religion withdraw to the private spheres.
How can one be a good professional, whether businessperson, politician, 
banker,  professor  or  engineer,  while  being  also a  good  person?  Is  it  a 
contradiction  that  professional  excellence  can  occur  in  the  absence  of 
moral  virtues?  The  channel  opened  by  the  conceptualization  of  the 
transcendent  motives  that  exist  behind  a  decision  -  together  with  the 
extrinsic  and  intrinsic  motives  already  known  from  different  scientific 
perspectives  -  contributes  a  way to unite  theory and  practice  in  ethical 
endeavours, and a possibility to learn where are we failing when we engage 
in a rigorous analysis of our behaviour from an ethical perspective.
2 Decision-Making: The Leading Character in the Human 
Drama
For human beings the mechanism of decision-making is not only a way to 
live their lives, but to decide how to live them. Once a decision has been 
made, the person can control, from within itself, its actions, it can live its 
life holistically: it has a biography. However, this control is not guaranteed 
beforehand,  since,  as  we  know,  the dominion over  the intellectual  self-
awareness and the freedom from its desires and sentiments is politic and 
not despotic, and it is formed through action. 
It  is in action and in decision,  and in the knowledge that  their exercise 
implies - practical reason - where the unity of all the operational strands of 
man  is  reached,  because  they  all  converge  in  one  sole  action.  The 
theoretical reason, or speculative knowledge, that emerges as the specific 
capacity of human beings that differentiates them from the other animals - 
the element that allows man to say "I") - does neither perfect human beings 
as  such,  nor  is  compromised  in  subjectivity.  While  this  last  one  feels 
compassion,  commits  and  perfects  itself  in  the  practical  reason,  in  the 
decision. To choose is to choose  oneself. The real unity of human beings 
within themselves and with the outer reality is won or lost in the exercise of 
free action.
The  ethical  value of  action (the  value  it  has  for  the  decision maker)  is 
different from the social value (the value it has for others). It is important to 
mark this difference in order not to reduce ethics to mere sociology. Hence, 
the ultimate criterion in deciding the ethical value of an action is not the 
"social acceptability" of the consequences of said action. This conception 
would make the mechanisms of the theory of human decision tremendously 
trivial, since it eludes the delicate articulation of human knowledge in the 
decision-making process. It also neglects to analyse the inner consequences 
the action has  within the subject  itself.  Understanding this gives  us  an 
understanding  of  how moral  virtues  grow within ourselves,  an essential 
condition for  the issue at  hand,  since  to talk  about  ethics  ignoring the 
moral virtues is like talking about mechanics ignoring gravitational forces. 
We could make a more or less poetic discourse about it, but nothing even 
remotely close to a rigorous analysis.
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The virtue so acquired manifests as an increase in the vital intensity that 
each of us adds to its own capacity.  We are empowered. We have  more 
power because we are more. That the end result of this operation remains 
inside us as agents of the action is something that needs to be stressed to 
palliate  the  neglect  suffered  by  this  very  important  inner  dimension  of 
human actions. It affects our manner of being. We make ourselves through 
it.
The  philosopher  MacIntyre  (1987)  has  shown  that  the  difficulty  in 
recovering the original meaning of the word virtue comes from the loss of 
the  theological,  or  finalist,  sense  of  reality,  and  consequently,  of  the 
obscuring  of  the  notion  of  human  nature,  of  the  blurring  of  our 
characteristic  way  of  being  as  humans.  This  is  because  virtue  is  the 
realization of those potentialities characteristic of the way of existing and 
behaving of human beings. If this way of being does not exist, or if it has a 
purely material character, the very sense of virtue disappears. It is at this 
point when we incur the risk of attempting to construct a conventional ethic 
with  notions  such  as  duty,  consensus,  emotion,  usefulness,  likeability, 
dialogue, love, pleasure or solidarity, all very well in themselves, but - with 
the  anthropological  sense  dissolved  and  disconnected  of  each  other- 
incapable  of  leading  anywhere  other  than  towards  utilitarianism  or 
relativism, realms both in which disorientation is insurmountable. On the 
other  hand,  the accumulation of  rules  and prescriptions to guarantee a 
positive human conduct ends up producing Pharisees.
In the exercise of choice, something is chosen, but ultimately what we end 
up  choosing  is  ourselves.  It  is  not  a  matter  of  wanting  something  for 
oneself, but eo ipso, a matter of wanting oneself for something. This is self-
realization and hence, it is also self-construction, because a person is not 
the same person depending on the values or tasks that is committed to.
3 Decision-Making within a Human Context
Any  satisfactory  conception  of  the  process  of  formation  of  the  ethical 
character  has  to  integrate  the  basic  tenet  that  we  are  not  isolated 
individuals  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  can  only  approach  human 
achievement when living closely and solidly with other people.  Our self-
realization demands an ongoing dialogue with other human beings that are, 
in some sense, part of us and vice versa. And this is not in addition to the 
individual,  but  a  constituting part  of the person as an essentially social 
being. Living in partnership with others is an essential condition to live with 
dignity.
The  person  is  an  absolute,  in  the  sense  that  is  something  unique, 
irreducible to anything else. My self is not interchangeable with anybody 
else's.  From  a  phenomenological-psychological  perspective,  the  human 
personal character is perceived in the quality of this self, this I, being open 
to a you. This minimum mutual acknowledgement between human beings, 
besides conditioning the acquisition of a fully human identity on the part of 
the individuals, is what makes possible the subsistence of this larger we 
93 
Volume 4, Number 1, © JSSE 2005 ISSN 1618-5293
that  is  the fabric that  allows life  in society in communities such as the 
business environment, the neighbourhood, the city or the political society. 
The person is essentially and simultaneously an individual and a relational 
being. The individual aspect alone cannot be stressed because "having no 
mirrors in which to reflect itself, the human being develops a fragile and 
poor personality, empty and full of complexes, and with the added difficulty 
that the societal relation is relegated to the merely accidental" (Alvira 1988, 
24).
This is not a matter of generating altruistic actions or beneficent attitudes 
at  random.  A  person,  whoever  it  may  be,  and  regardless  of  its 
circumstance, is untouchable, it has an incalculable value, it can never be 
exchanged for money or any other external or internal good. Woman and 
man are universal and transcendent realities. The wounding of anybody's 
dignity wounds, somehow, our own dignity, because the injured woman or 
man are never far from us, they are not strangers or indifferent to us.
To be means always to be before the other. The richer the reality, the better 
this  notion  is  understood.  Life,  particularly  the  life  of  the  spirit,  is 
unthinkable without relation. We are in the same measure that we depend, 
and to try to begin from cero is a fatal mistake. Our freedom can only be 
explained  by the  manner  of  our  dependence.  We  are  not  the  origin of 
ourselves. Once this is recognized, we can set on the appropriate path to 
orient  ourselves.  The  dependence  on  our  parents  is  so  radical  that  it 
determines  the  entire  development  of  our  future  capacities  and 
potentialities, even before birth. "The person is not made to be alone: this 
can be seen even at the biological level. At birth, the corporal, nervous and 
psychological development of man is rather incomplete; precisely because 
the decisive factor in him is the learning process (instinct needs habits to 
exercise all its functions). He needs to be fed, taken care and taught by 
others during many years before being able to fend for  himself"  (Yepes 
1996, 184).
What real value do we assign to those present in our lives? What real weight 
have those "others" in our decision-making process? Our reason allows us 
to identify them as human beings, but to value them as such, to internalize 
them as other "selves" we have to incorporate them in our decision-making 
process.
4 Decision-Making and Transcendent Motives
The Psychology of Learning (Bandura 1980) and the business environment 
(McGregor 1966) have familiarized us with the distinction between the so-
called extrinsic and intrinsic motives. The first type refers to the world of 
sensate  realities  and  aligns  with  the  rewards  or  punishments  the 
environment sends as responses to the actions of the individual: money, 
raises, prestige, rewards, etc. The satisfaction provided by the second set of 
motives is generated by the direct outcomes the action has on the subject 
executing the action, and not by an environmental response. Satisfaction 
such as that felt after performing a duty, engaging in professional learning, 
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the acquisition of  various  skills,  the  sense  of  achievement,  etc.,  are  all 
intrinsic motives.
Pérez  López  (1993)  breaks  this  dichotomy  proposing  a  third  type  of 
motivation:  the  transcendent  motives.  These  motives  respond  to  the 
Franklian  concern with the  search for  sense  outside  the subject,  in  the 
opening up of the person to the world. They address the consequences the 
action may have for those "others", or "other", that will receive the impact of 
our  action,  regardless  of  the  effect  the  same  action  may  have  on  the 
subject. These are the motives guiding those that are working to support 
their family, or on behalf of their country, or wanting to offer a good service 
to their clients, or those trying to be helpful to their workmates. These 
motives may not be confused with self-realization or with the enjoyment 
derived from the regard of others, since self-realization is not concerned, 
other than instrumentally, with the repercussions of our own behaviour on 
others and the regard of others does not flow from the one who acts to the 
others but the other way around.
The knowledge of the existence of transcendent motives is not only the 
result of the observation of behaviour. It is deduced from the study of the 
dynamics of the action. The behaviour of the decisor while interacting with 
one or more persons produces several types of outcomes, each susceptible 
to attract attention and become a powerful source of motivation.
1. Extrinsic outcomes: The interaction itself, called the efficacy of the 
plan of action. 
2. Internal outcomes: The learning of the active agent or the efficiency 
of the plan of action. 
3. External  outcomes:  the  learning  of  the  reactive  agent,  or  the 
consistency of the plan of action. 
One  or  several  of  these  outcomes  could  very  well  go  unnoticed  or  be 
underestimated by  the  decision  maker,  but  he  can  notice  them and,  if 
interested, he may want to pursue them, turning the results into motivation 
for action. This is how the three types of motives indicated can be deduced:
1. Extrinsic motives: What we expect  to receive  in exchange for the 
action. These motives respond to the most basic needs, those we 
could call material needs. They mean, ultimately, the possession of 
things  or  the  possibility  to  establish  sensate  relationships  with 
things. 
2. Intrinsic motives: What we expect to learn or enjoy while performing 
the action. These motives respond to cognitive needs. They address 
the subject's inner world, the capacity to do things, to get what we 
want. Through the appropriate learning process, a person develops 
what  is  called  operational  knowledge,  a  set  of  skills  needed  to 
manage  the  surrounding  environment.  The  sense  of  power  and, 
somehow,  the  feeling  of  security  derived  from  the  psychological 
states that depend upon the satisfaction of these needs. 
3. Transcendent motives: The manner in which others are expected to 
benefit from our actions. These motives address the affective needs, 
not only the need to be loved, but most specially, the need to love. 
These  motives  are  linked  to  the  attainment  of  appropriate 
relationships with others, that love us as persons and appreciate us 
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for  who  we  are,  and not  for  the  presence  or  absence  of  certain 
qualities, or because we are useful to them. The satisfaction derived 
from  actions  based  on  these  motives  is  made  manifest  in  the 
certainty of knowing that whatever affects us affects the other as 
well, because it affects us. "People have the ability to internalize - 
make  their  own-  everything  that  happens  to  other  people.  This 
internalization process is what we call, in a strict sense, love. People 
are capable of loving and being loved, and this relationship is what 
satisfies the emotional or affective relations" (Pérez López 1993, 60). 
These three motives may be present when performing the action. A doctor's 
foremost concern, for instance, is the health of his patients, although by 
caring for them he acquires prestige, new knowledge and good earnings at 
the same time. These motives are not the exclusive prerogative of those 
who generously spend their life on behalf of others. They are present in any 
human activity. This is a personal attitude towards work and life. The three 
motives  intervene  in any action,  but  the pre-eminence  of  one  upon the 
other depends on each individual. The manner in which a person allocates 
importance to each motive defines his or her motivational quality. 
The differentiating factor of this type of motivation is that the action seeks 
to satisfy the needs of a person or persons other than the subject's. The 
category  of  the  need  to  be  satisfied  may  be  in  any  of  the  categories 
mentioned  above:  quenching  their  thirst,  helping  them  become  better 
technicians  or  learn  a  new  software  application,  helping  them  become 
better parents, or quitting a drug habit. The determining factor is that we 
are seeking not a change in ourselves, or a result for ourselves, but a direct 
improvement of the other person's circumstance. 
The search for transcendent motives as a guiding principle of movement is 
one of the main traits that differentiate humans from animals. This is the 
type of motivation we refer to when talking of generosity, or the orientation 
towards service, or solidarity, etc. Colloquial language offers us a sample of 
this: when we qualify a person as "very humane", we mean this person takes 
into account what happens to other people and is willing to help them, that 
is,  the transcendent  motives are very present  in his  or her actions.  The 
opposite concept, that of a selfish or not very humane person defines a 
person whose actions are only directed to his or her own satisfaction, and 
do  not  take  into  account  the  difficulties  that  this  behaviour  may  be 
inflicting on others.
5 Three Different but Interconnected Motives Present in the 
Decision-Making Process
These three outcomes of the action are three different levels of reality, but 
are not detachable from each other. They are not mutually independent, but 
interconnected. The type of feasible actions each of us engages in depends 
on our inner state, that is, of the level of development of our will and our 
rationality. Not everybody is prepared to rescue somebody from a house on 
fire. To be able to do this, the person has had to previously develop the will 
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and  the  capacity  to  help  others.  Hence  our  capacity  to  engage  in 
increasingly costly interactions will depend on the level of development of 
our inner states. On the other hand, the inner states of the reactive agent, 
coupled with the exercise of individual freedom of action, determine.
We see then, that these three categories of reality called efficacy, efficiency 
and consistency affect the outcome, which is also influenced by the level of 
trust the reactive agent has in us, indicative of a particular inner state. A 
high degree of trust between two people allows a great deal of interactions 
between them that will be accompanied by the corresponding satisfaction 
they generate. It can be said that in this state all feasible interactions are 
already possible.
These  three  different  levels  of  reality,  since  they  are  all  significant  in 
themselves, can be the motivating factors of our actions, and the outcomes 
of said actions will, in turn, cover different human needs. 
The real  value of a specific action depends upon the value of all  of the 
outcomes and thus it would be incorrect to analyze the value of an action 
considering only one or two types of outcome, since the three are present 
whether the decision maker wants it or not. 
6 The Motivational Quality of the Decision
Virtue cannot be learned in the same manner as theoretical knowledge is 
acquired.  We  do  not  become  prudent  merely  by  reading  all  the  books 
written about prudence. It is a type of knowledge that must be exercised to 
really  know it.  This  knowledge  is  updated via  the  solutions  we  give  to 
"intermotivational" conflicts, that is, conflict that arises amongst different 
types of motives.  Conflict  that  arises within the same type of motive  is 
called "intramotivational". 
There can be no conflict of values in the theoretical line, or the unity of all 
values would not be valuable then, but it is obvious that there is a conflict 
of values in the practical plane caused by the unavoidable presence of evil 
in the world. Only in a world were all people were good people and all their 
values were realized would the conflicts between them disappear.
Pure egoism is probably as rare as pure altruism. Generally these three 
types of motives are present in any interaction. It is a normal motivation for 
teachers to exchange fees for services (helping students), to develop their 
professional  skills  (learning  to  teach)  and  make  their  students  learn 
something specific. Naturally, the weight assigned to each type of motive is 
different for each person. Some teachers will place more value in obtaining 
their fees while others will favour the learning of their students. And this is 
true for any professional because it  is true for any action of any human 
being.
It should be stressed that when we fail to incorporate transcendent motives 
in the decision-making process, it will become increasingly difficult for us 
to do so. The spontaneous impulse will be less and less sensitive to this 
type of motives while we will find ourselves gradually further from the most 
valuable  aspects of  reality.  "Assigning a hierarchy to values  implies  the 
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capacity to notice that there are different modes of reality and behavior, 
and  that  some have  higher  features  than others"  (López  Quintás  1993, 
444).
What  does  the  decision  maker  obtain  when  carrying  out  "consistent" 
actions?  Something  of  such  calibre  that  acting  differently  would  be 
irrational and dementia like. However, the "reward" must be experienced to 
know it and to feel it. "We are completely different when we are moral. We 
change inside out if we exercise our autonomy deciding to be moral,  in 
other words, if we relate to others granting them consideration as valuable 
beings  in  themselves"  (Sábada  1995,  47).  We  recognise  ourselves  as 
subjects  and  not  objects.  We  recognise  ourselves  as  persons,  and  this 
recognition cannot be achieved by competition, but by seeing in the other 
what exists within oneself, setting in motion the reciprocal appreciations 
and assessments.
The model proposed here does not entail a renunciation of value as such. 
There  is  a  preference,  since  the  action  is  going  to  contain  the  three 
interconnected order of values and none of them can be maximized. The 
rule to decide correctly would be "to always include the third party". Not 
surprisingly,  the  more  attractive  trait  from the  perspective  of  solving  a 
concrete and immediate problem is not acceptable from the perspective of 
consistency (taking into account the consequences that our actions would 
have for others). We will then seek a plan of action that while consistent - 
implicitly in pursuit  of  positive  learning  for  the  receptor  of  the plan of 
action- , has a minimum of efficacy. "Our personal axiological hierarchy is a 
result  of our preferences. This preference, even if it does not contribute 
value, contributes at least valuation and places the subject in a concrete 
position  before  the  values,  so it  is  true  that  "preference  has  a  creative 
action" (Lavelle 1951, 506).
To implement these not inconsistent actions, it is necessary the exercise of 
will power to restrain the immediate impulse - spontaneous motivation - to 
act in the most desirable manner at a given point. The moral virtues play a 
key role in the implementation of the right action: rationality aided by will 
has to stop and think of an alternative that contains consistency a priori, 
and then the subject has to act, after having conquered the spontaneous 
impulse to act in a more desirable manner. 
Since moral virtues are developed through practice, transcendent motives 
can be defined in two different manners: 
1. Motives based in the action being good for the other address those 
properties of the action that will provoke those consequences in the 
subject's moral virtues: the action must be carried out because it is 
good for "the environment". 
2. Motives based in the action developing moral virtues in the subject. 
Here transcendent motives are considered as those that improve the 
self-awareness of the decision maker, the development of his or her 
ability to take better decisions. 
Moral virtues contemplate the overall goodness of the action and not only 
the efficacy it has for the other. The paradigm of properly done valuations- 
a  necessary  reference  in  all  education in  values  -  requires,  always,  the 
incorporation of the "consistency of the plan of action", or paraphrasing 
Saint Augustine of Hippo, "Tell me what you love and I will tell you who you 
98 
Volume 4, Number 1, © JSSE 2005 ISSN 1618-5293
are." 
7 A priori Valuation of Each of These Motives
Prudence  is  the  virtue  that  foresees  and  anticipates  future  contingent 
scenarios before they take place in order to avoid a plan of action that 
would cause, rather than solve, problems. The assessment or valuation of 
these three levels of reality or a priori motives cannot be done only by one 
mechanism that  assesses  the  three  scenarios  together.  We  need "three 
skills or cognitive mechanisms," (Pérez López 1998, 205), since to qualify 
as motives they have to exist before the action. 
We  use  memory  -  perceptual  knowledge  -to  evaluate  a  priori,  extrinsic 
motives.  A concrete perception -  a  set  comprising action and reaction - 
accompanied by its associated satisfaction, sets the mechanism in motion 
anticipating the reward. Memory is the channel we use to connect with past 
experiences,  imprinted  inside  our  selves.  These  satisfactions  are  not 
transferable  or  communicable.  Perceptual  knowledge  sets in motion the 
mechanism of spontaneous motivation. Animals move in this manner, their 
memory is  extensive  and intensive:  they feel,  unlike  a  computer  whose 
memory is solely extensive and therefore feels neither pleasure nor pain 
resulting in zero cost operations.
We  use  rationality  -  abstract  knowledge-  to  evaluate  a  priori  intrinsic 
motives. Rationality is the archive where we file information about the value 
of  things.  This  process  takes  effort:  thinking,  inferring  and  making 
predictions based on the available data is costly. Thinking means utilizing, 
making  and applying  all  this  data  to  feed  the  process  and  arrive  to  a 
decision regarding the problem at hand. Here is where the will intervenes, 
and it is at this level where we speak of rational motivation.
However, we may have a very "refined" weighing process to evaluate a priori 
only one dimension: efficacy. In this manner we use reason instrumentally, 
treating others solely "in function of our interests", as "a means to", but not 
as  a  value  in  and  of  themselves.  This  corruption  of  prudence  has  a 
degenerating  effect  on  us  as  persons  and  eventually  disables  us  from 
making the same plans we were able to make before,  since the others, 
noticing our modus operandi, will not want to interact with us. We see how 
rationality articulates two intentions: the explicit, or what we seek with a 
specific plan of action, and the implicit, the degree in which we more or 
less care about the impacts of our actions on others. Rationality contributes 
the aim and the sense of the action and that is why it is such an important 
element  in  the  development  of  moral  values.  Ignorance,  when 
insurmountable, does not harm the subject morally, since he or she is using 
appropriately the available, albeit incomplete, data. The thinking process is 
done honestly before implementing the action, and therefore ignorance is 
not a corrupting factor.
What real value are we assigning the "other" receiving the impact of our 
action? The development of evaluative knowledge allows us to value the 
other as another self. It allows us to discover personal realities, that is, the 
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inner  states  of  other  person.  This  knowledge,  however,  calls  for  a  pre-
requisite. 
It is important to note that the individual level of awareness (or capacity for 
awareness) of the personal realities - incorporating them in the decision-
making process - is precisely the same capacity individuals have of feeling 
deep affective  satisfaction.  We tend to think  that  satisfaction of  human 
needs depends solely in what takes place outside the person. This is true - 
and only partly so - for material needs. The satisfaction of affective needs 
depends mostly of some thing that is inside the person: the state of his or 
her evaluative knowledge. Even when surrounded by others that truly love 
them, their deep affective needs will be unsatisfied in the absence of this 
type  of  knowledge,  because  they will  be  incapable  of  discovering,  and 
consequently of feeling the affection they feel for them.
For this knowledge to be present two conditions have to be met: 1) the 
presence of another person(s) that feels true concern for us, and 2) to know 
in an experiential (rather than theoretical) manner their true inner state.
It is a matter of designing plans of action where it is assumed - intended - 
that we can trust the other. This entails a cost, an effort and the risk of not 
arriving to the decision desired by the other.  We need to take this risk 
because avoiding these types of decisions precludes the discovery of the 
personal realities in an experiential manner, and therefore of feeling their 
value.  To  know  experientially  the  inner  states  of  the  other  -  the  non-
perceptual realities - we need to experiment, to design experiences to that 
effect.
The  cogitative  faculty,  different  from  the  animal  estimative  faculty, 
intervenes in this knowledge, however, if the decision maker systematically 
judges others and their actions in functions of his or her own desires, the 
human cogitative faculty is reduced to the animal estimative faculty. The 
subject is then dehumanized and animalized. 
"This habit,  in  the psychosomatic nature of man, can originate a stable 
dysfunction and even an organic injury (since the cogitative faculty, unlike 
the spiritual intelligence, has an organ, even though neurologists have yet 
to locate it  and perhaps they never will).  Here we have one origin for a 
reactive psychopathology that can escalate to extreme forms of dementia, 
and that in any case produces a grievous fracture of the personality and a 
painful psychological existence" (Cardona 1987, 127).
It  is  important  to  stress  again  the  distinction  between  needs  that  are 
satisfied by external factors - their satisfaction depends on the external -, 
and the desires or internal needs which satisfaction depends on the inner 
state, a self-generated state that is produced by the manner in which a 
person uses rationality and will. 
Prudence can direct or lead the cogitative faculty. This faculty addresses 
everything  real  that  is  concrete  in  its  temporal  dimension  from  the 
perspective of value. 
"The link between reason and the cogitative faculty allows us to understand 
that the practical reason has a practical apprehension, because if reason 
draws from the apprehensive powers as needed (ex necessitate), when it 
apprehends from the cogitative faculty it takes physical realities as goods. 
This practical apprehension is the basic act over which reason will act to be 
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able to move on to deliberation, to practical judgement and to dominion. 
All acts that underlie the corresponding habits that culminate in prudence" 
(Sellés 1999, 183).
The  development  of  this  evaluative  knowledge  -  the  knowledge  that  is 
reached when the decision maker is guided by rational motivation based on 
transcendent motives- is essential for human happiness, because we cannot 
be  happy  merely  by  thinking  about  it,  but  with  life.  Happiness  is 
experiential  and this includes feeling. Evaluative knowledge allows us to 
arrive to the point of "feeling" the value of the other as a person that loves 
us and that we are capable of loving. 
"That is why it can be said that motivation based on transcendent motives is 
the motivation that tries to orient human action towards our own personal 
improvement at the deepest plane of our individual self: our capacity to feel 
others as people, our capacity to establish deep affective relationships with 
other human beings" (Pérez López 1993, 61). 
8 An Educational Proposal Based on the Case Method
The  case  method is  a  tool  utilized  in  active  pedagogy.  It  analyzes  real 
situations by means of a systematic dialogue between teacher and students 
(Llano, 1996; Pérez Serrano, 1994). The student assumes a protagonist role 
and takes a decision after evaluating the situation posed. The role of the 
teacher - implemented through the mechanism of ongoing dialogue with 
the student-  is  to offer  a  sounding board  to contrast  the  reasoning  on 
which a specific  decision is  based,  to find out  why one alternative  was 
chosen over another, and to investigate the process in such a manner as to 
reveal  the  chain of  thinking that  led to the  judgement  of  the  situation 
studied as the case. 
In that lies the educational value of the Case Method compared to other 
educational methods. Its structure allows it to work on the thought process 
that has led the student to a specific plan of action, and allows the teacher 
to enlighten the student on the consequences that an incomplete plan of 
action would have in the long term. The criteria utilized during the course 
of the thought process engaged to chose a plan of action has to be explicit: 
1. I like it and I want to do it: achievement of satisfaction (efficacy). 
2. I  know  how  to  do  it  and  I  can  do  it:  achievement  of  learning 
(efficiency). 
3. I value it, I consider it, and the impact the plan of action has on the 
other matters to me: achievement of sense (consistency) 
Decisions are always prudential and relative to a specific decision maker, 
that has reached a given degree of virtue. It should be noted that the option 
chosen by the  student  has  to  be  on par  with  the  student's  developing 
capacity.  If  this is not the case, the student  has to retrace the deciding 
steps and generate  another decision that  carries  less sacrifice  from the 
perspective of spontaneous motivation. The correct, or right plan of action 
of one person may not be the correct plan of action for a different person, 
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because it does not have the necessary acquired virtue. That is why there 
are  not  optimal  decisions  as  such,  since  no  one  has  perfect  skills  of 
rationality  and  virtue.  There  are  no  "recipes  for  action"  that  can  be 
substituted for prudent thought. There are right decisions because they are 
complete as far as the criteria utilized and the consistency of the plan of 
action  has  not  been purposefully  left  out  of  the  process.  The  decision 
arrived at in such a manner is correct for the decision makers that possess 
that level of acquired virtue. 
The Case Method is also a motivational instrument for the student. The 
term "motivation" refers to the force that drives conduct. It  is the inner 
impulse that gives the strength necessary to achieve the ends or set goals. 
There is a clear difference between the impulse to act (motivation) and the 
ends (motives) pursued by such action. When the cases presented in the 
course of teaching are close to the life of the student, the sense of the 
learning  process  can  be  easily  grasped  when  it  is  connected  to  its 
usefulness as a decision making tool. In this case motivation is high and 
student involvement becomes personal (intrinsic motive) in that the student 
wants to learn what is being taught, rather than academic, in the sense of 
obtaining a passing grade (extrinsic motive).
The  necessary  condition  for  the  student  to  develop  rationality  is  the 
consciously perceived existence of a connection, between what the teacher 
tries  to  teach  and  the  solving  of  vital  problems  affecting  the  student. 
Rationality - the skill of knowing how to pursue a thought process - is a 
habit  that  can  only  be  developed  by  solving  real  problems  to  one's 
satisfaction,  and accompanied by the impulse to engage in actions that 
increase this degree of satisfaction achieved. 
The sufficient condition for the development of the correct  rationality is 
met when the three categories, or types of outcomes - efficacy, efficiency 
and consistency- irreducible and different from each other and, that occur 
when we apply a specific plan of action, are taken into account. 
9 A Specific Educational Experience 
This method for teaching how to think has been applied successfully and 
has been documented (López-Jurado, 2001). During this study, two groups 
of students (in the age range of 16 - 17) studying Ethics by two different 
methodologies were compared. Group A (27 students) studied the subject 
utilizing  the  Case  Method.  Group  B  (28  students)  utilized  the  more 
traditional method of critical analysis of movies, documentaries, newspaper 
articles, etc., in three different settings.
The evaluation criteria of practical rationality was to find out to what extent 
the students learn to realize that there are third parties that are recipients 
of their actions; that is, they learn to tame in themselves the impulse to 
engage in the plan of action more desirable to them, and stop to think on a 
more convenient alternative within a given circumstance. The criteria reside 
in recognizing the transcendent motives apart from the extrinsic motives. 
Three categories were utilized to analyze the students' answers to the three 
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situations posed:
T: transcendent motives
E: extrinsic motives 
I: intermediate category encompassing the different levels of positioning of 
the students in the answers. 
Space considerations prevent showing the full investigation. Only the main 
points and the results of the first situation "party at home" will be included.
The question posed was: "Is there a difference in the process of learning 
practical rationality when it is taught by two different methodologies? The 
variables are: 
a. Dependent -or practical rationality criteria measured by establishing 
the  difference  between  transcendent  and  extrinsic  motives  using 
three different instruments (cases). 
b. Independent - or the method utilized to learn practical rationality. 
Both the Case Method and the traditional method were applied in 
this instance 
When the study was conducted by the same teacher (the one applying the 
Case Method), no statistically significant differences were detected between 
both programs, however, there was a trend to show transcendent results 
associated to this method.
Table 1. Same teacher taught both methodologies 
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When  the  study  was  conducted  by  different  teachers,  acute  significant 
statistical  differences  emerged in the practical  aspect.  The  difference in 
outcome  shows  that  the  students  in  Group  A  are  capable  to  consider 
transcendent  motives  and  incorporate  them  explicitly  in  their  plan  of 
action, unlike the students that have not received that type of instruction. 
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In  the  case  presented  here,  as  well  as  in  other  cases  part  of  the 
investigation, the higher number of extrinsic and intermediate responses 
versus  the  transcendent  responses,  shows  that  transcendent  values  are 
learned when there is a specific action that reveals them, and when they are 
not present, the students tend towards the more desirable plan without 
thinking that there are, perhaps, other alternative more convenient to all 
involved; or simply act following their first impulse, because, even though 
they have heard interesting things during the course, they do not now how 
to apply them to real life, in the here and now. 
On  the  other  hand,  that  the  program  is  imparted  by  the  same  or  by 
different teachers is not an indifferent circumstance. It  becomes obvious 
that a teacher that has not incorporated to his/her life the transcendent 
motives in question, cannot teach practical rationality by means of the Case 
Method, since the inconsistency between what  is said and what  is  done 
prevents the students from learning what the instructor is trying to teach 
without having prior personal experience of it. It  is not possible to help 
students along the thought process incorporating transcendent motives to 
pose  alternatives  of  action if  the  teacher  does  not  materialize  them in 
his/her teaching. 
The following three reasons support selecting the Case Method for teaching 
the virtue of prudence: 
1. The very nature of the method makes the student face a specific 
decision-making process. 
2. The motivation that inspires, given the case is well selected (close to 
their life experience, personal interest) 
3. The  fact  that  it  demands  a  total  consistency on the  part  of  the 
teacher with the teaching subject. 
We can say that practical rationality is learned by direct intervention via a 
program where the decision-taking criteria are explicit and complete, and 
the  teacher  imparting  this  knowledge  identifies  with  the  tenets  of  the 
method being taught.
10 Conclusions
The  point  where  knowledge  and action intersect  constitutes  one  of  the 
central points of the problems faced by epistemology. This meeting point 
that has served as starting point for the natural sciences to produce varied 
practical  technological  knowledge  presents  for  the  social  science  an 
obstacle to produce applied knowledge. The option that the Case Method 
offers for the development of moral values via the process that allows the 
decisor to arrive to, and take the appropriate decision, since it incorporates 
both the theory and the practice, overcomes this inbuilt  difficulty of the 
discipline. 
The  purpose  of  education  is  to  produce  competent  professionals  and 
people able to live in society, to build society through the exercise of free 
actions. Not only the actual functioning of educational institutions, but the 
very survival of our society depends on the operational existence of true 
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ethical values.
Ethics is a science that pointed out, thousands of years ago, that the de 
facto value a human being assigns to another is not a matter of "what" is 
being "valued" -  it  is always a human being - but of "who" is doing the 
"valuing" and of the level of development this person has reached in the 
appreciation of what is valuable. There is a process by which we learn to 
value reality without being deluded by superficial appearances
It is essential to determine which type of capabilities we intend to develop 
through the educational process. If we develop only operational capacities, 
we are considering Moral Education as a "moral product" that is transmitted 
to a third party via  the granting of an "Ethics  credit",  for  instance.  The 
formation of virtues will  then be relegated to whatever can be obtained 
through  disciplinary  rules,  extra-curricular  activities,  and  of  course,  the 
exemplariness as role models of the educators themselves. This is all very 
well and it is important and necessary, but it is not enough.
If we also want to develop valuative capacities together with the operational 
capacities, because we are teaching our students to do complete valuations 
of reality, we are entering in the deliberative process necessary to exercise 
prudence, helping then to foster a moral education. I say foster because it 
is a goal that is only reached if the recipient of this education so desires. In 
this manner we are endeavoring to provide an education that will enable 
them to be competent and virtuous professionals.
Our  proposal  teaches  how we  can  acquire  the  virtue  of  solidarity  -  by 
valuing the other "I" of whose wellbeing I am responsible in the measure 
that I can influence it- necessary to lend cohesiveness to a social life and 
engagement in a harmonious manner. Selfishness corrodes social life: the 
entrepreneur that seeks economic benefit solely; the politician that is only 
after power; the scientists in search of glory and popularity, etc. We need to 
learn  how  to  make  individual  decision  compatible  with  those  social 
objectives that are of interest to the whole of society, whether this society 
is the family unit, the company, etc.
This goal demands that human organizations are subject to the laws ruling 
human behavior in the same manner that physical laws cannot be ignored 
when building a particular machine or device. If the designer ignores one 
particular physical law the machine will not work. Something similar takes 
place in the workings of human organizations and the natural laws that rule 
human behavior. In order to survive, any organization has to address and 
satisfy, at least, some of the motives that drive people to cooperate with the 
organization,  since they belong to the organization in the measure that 
they have  motives  that  drive  them to  do  so.  And  no  organization  can 
survive without people. 
We  humans  are  much more  flexible  than material  objects,  but  we  also 
operate within a set of limited possibilities of action, outside of which lies 
destruction when the action undertaken goes against the laws of our own 
nature. 
There cannot be professional excellence devoid of moral virtues. This error 
can  only  occur  when  the  profession  or  professional  skills  have  been 
reduced to mere technical knowledge, stripping them of its more essential 
dimension: how to use that knowledge to solve human problems. 
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For  communication  to  become  the  true  binding  element  of  societal 
dynamics  such  as  reaching  agreements  after  controversies,  the  starting 
point seems to lie in each person finding the development of their own 
rationality and will power. In other words, the development of their moral 
values. The foundations that make society possible.
Notes
(1) The open-ended question "What have you learned in this class?" was also 
posed to the students. The answers showed that students had extended 
and generalized what they had learned to their personal lives. 
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